

**The Prospects for State Failure in Pakistan:
Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Fissures
Summary**

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Key Questions: What do we mean by 'state failure' in Pakistan?

What is meant by “state failure” as an anticipated condition in Pakistan? People seem to have quite different implicit assumptions when they throw around the idea of Pakistan as a "failed state." Those assumptions should be unpacked.

Four and a half theoretical futures seem to be plausible to some degree:

(1) National disintegration: separatist civil wars and breakup of contemporary Pakistan into two or more independent states, presumably along ethno-linguistic or regional lines.

(2) Failure of Democracy: democratic institutions and modern legal systems cease to prevail or lose legitimacy as the operative norms of state governance, presumably displaced by autocratic rule -- military, bureaucratic, theocratic, or some hybrid (i.e., the Iraq model? the Iran model? the Saudi model?).

(3) Economic paralysis (entropy): economic product shrinks and social development is choked, rich-poor disparities widen, relentless population growth swells the uneducated and unemployed strata, overloading public institutions and threatening their collapse, and triggering involuntary out-migration (some West African models?).

(4) Pervasive internal anarchy: the state order in Pakistan succumbs to 'warlords', regional mafias, and predatory Islamic groups with hooks in the police and regular armed services, in regional and localized turf fights -- over legal and illicit economic assets (the Somali model?).

(2b/4b) Nuclear loss of control: anarchy in society and breakdown in military discipline leads to factional contests for control over nuclear weapon assets, and possible theft or migration of nuclear weapons and sensitive technologies to neighboring countries or terrorist organizations. (This scenario is not the focus of this paper, but could be a derivative of certain projections.)

Basic Conclusions:

1. Regional or ethno-linguistic separatism as threats of Pakistani state failure (national disintegration) (See Chart 1, columns on National Disintegration)

- Separatist potentials in Pakistan have been largely defused by demographic, political and economic change, and by the vaccination effect of the Soviet intervention and defeat in Afghanistan.
- Separatist potentials in Pakistan could only be reawakened in the contexts of: (a) war (e.g., with India); or (b) sustained major power geopolitical intervention. Major power intervention of this kind seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.
- Separatism had significance in Pakistan during the Cold War. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, removed the most plausible external source of support for successful separatism in Pakistan.
- Ethno-linguistic or regional movements in Pakistan today, such as in Sindh, could still stir up a lot of local disorder and tie up the security forces -- as the Sindhis did

within Sindh in 1983 under Zia's tenure. But this is a very different problem, and a much less serious a threat to the state than potentially successful separatism.

The Pushtoonistan problem was largely overcome even before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It was originally an Afghan irredentist problem. In Pakistan, it was based in certain districts of NWFP in rural areas, led by landlords and supported by tenant farmers. The primary strength of the original Khudai Khidmatgars (Red Shirts led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan) and successor National Awami Party (NAP section led by Wali Khan) was in just four of the six settled districts in NWFP -- Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Mardan and had little reach among Pathans in FATA or elsewhere.

-- Pushtoonistan never had any significant urban middle or lower middle class following.

-- Pushtoons from the lower middle classes, urban as well as rural, were drawn closely into the instruments of state -- the Army and civil services. In the security services, they were even more favored, in ratio to population, than Punjabis.

-- Army patronage and expenditures were very high in NWFP. The NWFP economy has become closely integrated with that of Punjab.

-- Pushtoons from the lower and lower middle classes were extraordinarily mobile and entrepreneurial, forming small businesses, migrating between their homes and jobs in the Gulf states, and taking over private transport businesses everywhere, including Karachi.

-- Nationwide political parties elections, the PPP as well as the Muslim League, made great headway in NWFP and Baluchistan in the 1970 and 1977 elections, eating into the former voting strength of the Pushtoonistan leadership even in rural strongholds.

The Baluchistan problem was potentially serious in that it sought to generate separatist and nationalist sentiment within a culturally distinct ethno-linguistic group that had its own autonomous history and that had not been deeply affected by British colonial rule.

-- The Baluchis were accustomed to having arms and historically overlapped with Iran as well as Afghanistan. Within Pakistan, the Baluchistan area made up 42 per cent of the entire country. Baluchi separatism was perceived as a threat to the state of Pakistan, most visibly so during the insurrection of 1973-75 in the Bhutto period. But the Army suppressed it even before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Zia was very effective in coopting the Baluch. Baluchi struggle for nationhood against the center in Pakistan was already at a low ebb, but died with the Afghan war.

-- Baluch nationalism was largely articulated by tribal chiefs (sardars) and an allied student movement, but limited by the fact that the base population was very small. Moreover, Pushtoons were numerous and even dominant in parts of Baluchistan (northern districts), and significant fractions of the Baluchi-speaking population were assimilated in southern Punjab and northern Sindh.

-- Baluch insurrection was contained by playing off the sardars and principal tribes against each other (divide and rule) and by coopting them as intermediaries -- giving them some autonomy to control resource inputs from the center along with the effects of modernization. The sardars were responsive knowing that modernization otherwise would naturally imperil their traditional authority over tribes and clans, along with the sources of their own wealth.

The *Sindhudesh* or Sindhi nationalist problem was probably the most significant potential base of separatism in Pakistan because of the long history of Sindhi states prior to British rule, the highly developed language, and the relative size and territorial compactness of the Sindhi population in Sindh province. It was geographically an ominous threat too because Sindhi independence could turn northern Pakistan into a landlocked country.

-- Sindhi political unrest is not totally vanquished today, and is probably the most dangerous of all the regions in Pakistan, especially in the event of war with India. Its separate nationalist impulse, however, has been eroded by huge demographic changes, the integrative effects of Bhutto's Sindh-based PPP having ruled Pakistan as well as Sindh province, and some degree of success of Sindhi-speaking middle classes making their way into public employment.

-- The Sindhudesh movement lost part of its footing with the flows of population into India from Sindh and into Sindh from India right after partition in 1947. The Sindhi-speaking middle class was predominantly Hindu, and most Hindus, virtually all in the urban areas, migrated to India in 1947.

-- The residual Sindhi-speaking middle class was far smaller in numbers and swamped by the urbanized segments of the Muhajirs (Urdu- and Gujarati-speaking refugees) who flooded into Karachi and the bigger cities of Sindh (Hyderabad and Sukkur), essentially taking the places the Hindus left in educational institutions, finance, commerce and the civil services. In Karachi, skilled lower-class refugees from India filled the openings for blue collar workers in the factories and trades.

-- The Sindhi-speaking political class essentially lost control over their province after partition, while the capital of the country was in Karachi. Punjabis and Pathans moved into Karachi and urban Sindh, so that Sindhi natives became a small minority within Karachi, and less than a majority even in their other big cities. Only in the rural areas were their majorities intact.

-- The Sindhi national movement was gradually overtaken by incremental success in winning back Sindhi as an official provincial language with educational legitimacy, and in obtaining a substantial fraction of the civil service jobs within Sindh.

-- In effect, partition robbed Sindhis of their middle class strength and forced them into such rearguard political actions as trying to recover a province called Sindh and to establish some degree of influence within its institutions. Army suppression of the

Sindhis (e.g., under Zia) was much more ruthless than against Pushtoons or Baluchis. Restoration of Sindh province and Bhutto's central and provincial takeover of the PPP in 1970 made integrative avenues in Pakistan more attractive than a separatist course.

The Muhajir (MQM) problem is not a genuine nationalist or separatist problem but is an interesting ethno-linguistic phenomenon. Since it goes hand in hand with considerable political and even criminal violence, especially in Karachi, but also elsewhere in urban Sindh, it is a particularly sensitive one from a national security point of view. Pakistanis from the north fear that India could use, or is using, the Muhajirs in Sindh as a fifth column for subversion, with destabilizing effects on Pakistan.

-- It is interesting from an ethno-linguistic standpoint because it has no historical territorial base in Pakistan, and is an amalgamation of migrants from India, the biggest part being Urdu-speakers.

-- It is also interesting because the Muhajirs were initially socio-economically more advanced than Pakistani society at large and therefore relatively privileged at the outset. They were key actors in Karachi and by default in Pakistan during the period Karachi was the national capital.

-- The political action of the Muhajirs as an ethno-linguistic group after the capital was shifted to Islamabad is best understood as a reaction to their declining influence and privilege -- as native Pakistanis, especially Punjabis and Pathans came to hold predominant power at the center and incrementally extended their influence in Karachi and urban Sindh.

II. Religious extremism and sectarianism as threats of Pakistani state failure (see Charts 1, columns on revolutionary state overthrow and "harsh indigenization")

- If the threat of regional and ethno-linguistic separatism has been largely vanquished in Pakistan, the threat of political violence and disorder has not. Political violence and anarchic behavior may still threaten failure of the state and its institutions. Violence emanating from Islamic fundamentalist religious revival and extremist organizations, and from the agitation of Sunni-Shia sectarian differences can threaten state failure.

-- The glib use of the term *Talibanization* of Pakistan points to spreading perceptions in the West of this as the dominant new phenomenon in Pakistan. But this is a caricature, not reality. Being taken in this way may give satisfaction to Islamists, but is hardly a satisfactory way to pursue our interests.

-- Chart 2 lists the Sunni political and extremist organizations in Pakistan, and their characteristics. It also makes an indirect point: there is no single organization that dominates the Islamic revival in Pakistan, and none that has the broad public appeal that the Taliban won by imposing peace in the Pushtoon areas of Afghanistan. Islamic political organizations in Pakistan are not united nor ideologically similar but rather are quite different and generally are rivals.

- That said, a key question to be addressed is: How much of the political violence and disorder in Pakistan today is attributable not to religious revival, extremism, and sectarian conflict, but rather to ongoing *indigenization* of the political system?
 - By indigenization, I'm referring to rural migration to the cities, and cross-regional migration of Pathans and Afghan refugees into Karachi and urban Sindh, urban Punjab, and Baluchistan. Migrants interact competitively with other ethno-linguistic groups who are already there, and who already have their plates full with past grievances.
 - Indigenization brings more common, and less cosmopolitan, people face to face with modern political institutions. In Pakistan, this tends to bring along with it elements of traditional Islam, but not necessarily the agenda of orthodox Islamic parties.
 - Indigenization of political institutions in Pakistan tends to be a challenge both to Democracy and to order (points 2 and 4 on threats of state failure, in the outline earlier) -- at least as we perceive these from a Western perspective.
- While distinguishing religiously based violence and the effects of harsh indigenization, the after-effects of the Afghan war on the domestic situation in Pakistan also needs to be filtered out. How much does this contribute to a form of anarchy that could in turn threaten the state with failure? How much of this is a passing condition?
 - Gun traffic means the effects of political violence among competing groups are more lethal than they used to be, whether they originate in religious politics or ordinary ethnic group politics.
 - Growth of criminal organizations also matters, and gets caught up with police-societal interaction and the competition among ethnic groups. These tend to bring alive perceptions of anarchy (point 4 in the outline).
- Another distinction should be added here: Is a "political revolution" a plausible scenario in Pakistan -- a takeover of power by a group that has the capacity to attempt to transform the political system, if not society? One troubling scenario for Pakistan is the prospect of a political revolution that overthrows the state as we know it now. If such a revolution were to occur in Pakistan, would it be from without, or from within?
 - The only places such a change could emanate from in Pakistan seem to me to be two, first the military itself, and second the more disciplined of the Islamic political organizations. Residual separatist groups and the existing national political parties in Pakistan do not present either a revolutionary agenda or the capacity to mount and organize a revolution.

- Chart One (Probabilities of State Failure Scenarios in Pakistan) is an analytic forecast of who might promote the troubling scenarios. The numeric judgments admittedly are conjectural. This type of chart nonetheless has the virtue of forcing discussion about scenarios that reflect the distinctions between religious conflicts and harsh indigenization as a source of multiple social conflicts that can threaten the failure of the state in Pakistan.
- Chart One suggests by way of measures on a five-point scale that:
 - While the residual effects of regional ethno-linguistic separatist forces are weak (except possibly in the event of foreign war), they are respectably powerful in reinforcing the dimension of harsh indigenization, particularly with respect to elements of "traditional Islam."
 - On harsh indigenization, Punjab comes into play; separatism against the center is not relevant in Punjab, but rural to urban-migration is, and contributes to harsh indigenization.
 - The probability that Islamic political parties would be the source of a political revolution is not high, but it is greater than zero. One can assume that Islamic political parties would like to bring about a more explicitly Islamic state, but one cannot assume that their leaders believe in or plan for an overthrow of the state. The JI and JUAH may be exceptions.
 - The probabilities are very low for an Islamic revolution "from without," and only the JUI (or unaccustomed cooperation between the JUI, JUP and JI) would figure realistically as having any capacity to rally that kind of action.
 - The probability that Islamic political parties could bring about a political revolution "from within," by infiltrating the Army and state institutions, is somewhat greater, but still much less than likely overall. The political parties that would have some inclination and perhaps capacity to promote a revolution from within are the JUI and JUAH.
- Chart One also provides a way of suggesting how Islamic political organizations and the natural social forces in Pakistan might coincide to determine whether the Islamic content of indigenization is more "traditional," or, instead, more orthodox and by implication more "extremist."
 - This is a policy-relevant point. The Western perception of Pakistan will be affected unfavorably by any increase in Islamic appearance. But Pakistan's likely behavior towards the West if it absorbs a traditional variant of Islam through indigenization may be easier to deal with than if indigenization infuses Pakistan with a high quotient of Islamic orthodoxy. The latter probably would be more susceptible to militancy.

- As the two columns under "harsh indigenization" show, regional forces left to themselves are more likely to be conducive to "traditional Islam." The Islamic political organization most likely to reinforce this form of indigenization is the JUP. The Shia Tehrik-i-Jaffriya could do the same, if push comes to shove, but the Shias in Pakistan generally prefer a secular government as their safeguard against extremism.
- In contrast, the JUI, JUAH, and the JI would be prone in varying degrees to support outcomes that are more conducive to orthodox and, by implication, extremist Islam.
- These are judgments about predisposition. Further analysis would show that most of the Islamic political parties are as patronage oriented as the secular political parties. Patronage requirements tends to work in a different direction than extremism.

Policy Implications:

- A territorial breakup of Pakistan is much less likely in the aftermath of the Cold War than it was before. It is hard to see any conditions that would lead to the reawakening of separatism in Pakistan, other than a long war with India.
- The two images of state failure in Pakistan that seem likely to persist are of a recurring failure in Democracy, first, and, second, a propensity to increased anarchy. These may also have adverse implications for the economy, and therefore the economy may continue to labor.
- In Western eyes, the translation of these images may be worse than the reality on the ground in Pakistan. But the appearances probably will tend to work against smooth, cooperative and substantive US-Pakistani relations.
- The odds of an Islamic political revolution that overthrows the state directly are not high, but are conceivable. The Islamic electoral support so often referred that caps them at 20 per cent would be misleading if political and social conditions were conducive to a revolution.
- But even if there is never a direct Islamic takeover of the state, Islam will continue to encroach on the state in Pakistan. This will occur merely because of the inexorable process of urbanization and harsh indigenization, the circulation of new participants into politics and the bureaucracy, and the intensity of group competition for material and status benefits.
- For enlightened Pakistani leaders to have the best chance to head off the most serious forms of Islamic encroachment, sectarian group conflict, spread of arms and lethality of conflict among competing groups, a constructive US policy is important, toward Pakistan in the first instance, but also towards India and Afghanistan, the most intimate neighbors.

- US policy interests in regional stability, avoidance of war, restraint of proliferation, and moderation of extremist appeals in Islamic countries all imply that Pakistan's future could make a substantial difference.
- A constructive US policy would be one of engagement, selective engagement perhaps, but an affirmative one that focuses heavily in two areas.
- One policy area would aim to deal with regional security issues. An integral part of such a policy would be efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue, the principal flashpoint, and the crucial obstacle also to slowing nuclear, missile and advanced weapons proliferation in the subcontinent. This would have to involve serious efforts to deal with the real equities, including the interests of Kashmiris.
 - This could not be allowed to be partial to either side, and this means not being partial to India by default or pretext. Cooperation in counter-terrorism, for instance, should be with both governments, not with one against the other.
- The second area would be working out a series of projects for social, educational and economic development that respect the reality of markets but address the real needs of the country for employment. It should also look for a way to rehabilitate Afghanistan, when the political climate loosens and practical opportunities emerge.
 - Reducing the standing conflict with India over Kashmir is probably the most important way to reduce the stimulus to training and expanding armed militias and extremist agendas associated with Islamic political parties in Pakistan.
 - Social, educational and economic development -- education and real economy jobs - - are the most important avenues for limiting the utility of the Islamic madrassahs and the current appeal of jobs, or of service in paramilitary organizations, in the Islamic organizational sector.
- Managing a constructive US policy would require the ability to differentiate between the normal effects of indigenization, including traditional Islam, and the encroachment by orthodox, politicized and extremist elements. This need not be overwhelmingly difficult for dedicated professionals. It may be difficult however for mass media journalists, and for the American public.
- The fly in the ointment is certain to be twofold. A more indigenized polity in Pakistan is not going to be as cosmopolitan, at least not for a while, as the Pakistan that we were familiar with in the best periods of our relationship.
 - It will be a more prickly leadership and polity, but not necessarily immature and feckless.

- Our leadership needs to be clear headed about those sensitivities, but thick-skinned and persistent -- avoiding needless confrontation -- with an eye to future.
- The recurring very specific and almost predictable danger to rebuilding and sustaining a constructive relationship must also be acknowledged: The degree of encroachment of politicized Islam and proliferation of armed groups, criminal as well as political, means that deliberate provocations that threaten Americans or hold them hostage probably will arise periodically -- with the objective of poisoning relations with the United States.
 - An affirmative US policy, given our media and public opinion propensities these days, will not stand for much of that, particularly if there is any doubt that the authorities in Pakistan are intimidated by or inclined to take advantage of such a crisis.

That said, the only way to give the authorities in Pakistan the confidence to assert Pakistan's long term national interests over troublemakers of any kind is constructive engagement. In the final analysis, the national leadership preferences in Pakistan are still congruent with our own, preferring Democracy, resisting Islamic extremism, favoring economic modernization, and abhorring anarchy.

APPENDIX

Some Glossary terms and information

ISLAMIC GROUPS

Militant organizations and groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir (*the most violent are marked with an asterisk and generally are believed closely linked to Pakistan*):

All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) - umbrella organization in Kashmir, headed by alternating chairpersons, previously Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (son of Srinagar religious leader, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, who was assassinated). Has a seven-member executive committee. APHC preference is for “azadi” (independence) but possibly willing to accept a well-defined and genuine form of autonomy (“Kashmiriat”) for Kashmir Valley and Muslim-majority districts of J&K; other leaders: Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Khwaja Abdul Ghani Lone. Lone heads the Jammu Kashmir People's Conference. According to *The Hindu*: “The pro-Pakistan groups which are in Hurriyat include the Jamat-e-Islami, People's League, Islamic Student's League and the Muslim League.”

7-Member Hurriyet Executive Committee as of January, 2001:

Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat – Muslim Conference (chairperson at this time)
 Syed Ali Gilani – Jama’at-e-Islami-e-Kashmir (considered pro-Pakistan)
 Abdul Ghani Lone – J&K People’s Conference (azadi, ambiguous)
 Mirwaiz Umar Farooq – Awami Action Committee (azadi, ambiguous)
 Yasin Malik – J&K Liberation Front (independence)
 Maulvi Abbas Ansari – Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (pro-Pakistan)
 Shaikh Abdul Aziz – People’s League (ambiguous) (Shabbir Shah is a key leader of this group)

Organizations under the APHC:

Names of the General Body of the APHC

- | S. No. | Name of the Party | Head of the Party |
|--------|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. | AAWAMI Action Committee | Mirwaiz Molvi Umar Farooq |
| 2. | Jamaat-E-Islami Jammu and Kashmiri | Syed Ali Geelani (or Gilani) |
| 3. | Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference | Abdul Gani Lone |
| 4. | Muslim Conference | Prof. Abdul Gani |
| 5. | Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front | Muhammad - Yasin Malik |
| 6. | People's League | S. Hamid (or Shaikh Abdul Aziz?) |
| 7. | Ittihadul Muslimeen | Moulana - M. Abbas Ansari |
| 8. | All Jammu & Kashmir Employees Confederation | - Ishtiaq Qadri |
| 9. | Employees and Workers Confederation | |
| 10. | Anjuman-E-Tabligul Islam | - Syed Qasim Shah Bukhari |
| 11. | Liberation Council | Moulana - M. Abbas Ansari |
| 12. | Jamiat-E-Ahle Hadith | - Moulana Tahiri |
| 13. | Kashmir BazmeTawheed | - Moulana Mohammed Mubariki |
| 14. | Jamiat-E-Hamdania | - Moulana M. Yasin Hamdani |
| 15. | Kashmir Bar Association | - Mian Abdul Qayoum |
| 16. | Political Conference | - Abdul Samad |
| 17. | Tehreek-E-Huriati Kashmiri | - Moulana Mohammad Tari |
| 18. | Jamate Ulama-E-Islam | - Abdul Gani Azhari |
| 19. | Anjamani Auqafi Jama Masjid | - Molvi Mohammad Umar Farooq |
| 20. | Muslim Khawateen Markaz | - Ms. Zamrooda Habib |
| 21. | Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Committee | - Noor-Ul-Hassan |

22. Jammu and Kashmir People's Basic Rights(Protection) Committee - Justice Moufi Bahauddin Farouqi
23. Employees & Workers Confederation (Arsawi Group)
24. Students Islamic League - Shakeel Bakshi
25. Islamic Study Circle - Dr. Yusuf Umar
26. Auqaf Jama Masjid - Ghulam Muhammad Bhat

Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a “secular” rather than Islamist organization, and devoted to Kashmiri independence or “self-determination”. Not a puppet of Pakistan. Now split into two factions – one is led by Yasin Malik, another by Amanullah Khan. It’s predecessors date back to 1974, when Sheikh Abdullah was still alive, and the actual organization was first proclaimed in 1977 in London by Amanullah Khan. Yasin Malik has renounced violence and concentrates on peaceful struggle. Amanullah Khan has a wider agenda that permits use of violence for political aims.

Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party (JKDFP) - led by Mr. Shabbir Ahmad Shah in Srinagar.

Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (Muslim Revolutionary Center)

Al Umar –led by Mushtak Ahmed Zargar, composition Kashmiri

Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin – Pir Sahib Syed Salahuddin, chief; other leaders: Abdul Majid Dhar, Master Ahsan Dhar. Hizb founded in 1989 as the militant wing of the J&K-based Jama’at-e-Islami, headed now by Ghulam Mohammed Bhat; Hizb perhaps originally named *Al-Badr*; inspired by Afghan *Hizb-e-Islami*; Hizb allegedly cooperates with Pakistani forces, but much of its membership is Kashmiri-based (including Azad Kashmir) and not totally loyal to Pakistan.

Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen – Muzaffarabad-based group that might become active if Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin fades.

Hizb-ul Momineen – a militant fighting group whose membership is almost exclusively Kashmiri (i.e., Kashmiri valley).

Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC) – chair has been Syed Salahuddin, of Hizb. MJC is said to be umbrella group of 17 pro-Pakistan militant organizations, including: (1) Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin; (2) Muslim Janbaz force – chief is Mohammad Usman; (3) etc.

***Harkat-ul-Ansar (now, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin)** [linked to **Al Faran** which kidnapped and probably killed five foreign tourists (possibly a variant or splinter group of the Harkat-ul-Ansar)] . Former Harkat leaders (now dead): Sajjad Afghani and Nasarullah Langaryal. The Harkat ul-Ansar was derived from the merger of two Pakistani activist groups, *Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami* and *Harakat ul-Mujahedin*, and led by Maulana Saadatullah Khan. The militant transformation came about as part of the Afghan jihad. With a *pan-Islamic ideology*, the outfit strove to achieve the secession of Jammu and Kashmir from India through violent means and its eventual merger with Pakistan. About 60 per cent of its estimated 1000 strong cadre were Pakistanis and Afghans. The Harkat-ul-Ansar was termed a terrorist organization by the US due to its association with the exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden in 1997. To avoid the repercussions of the US ban, the group was recast as the Harkat ul-Mujahiddin in 1998.

***Lashkar-e-Taiba (Tayyaba)** (“Army of the Pure” or "Army of the Righteous") – said to be terrorist arm of the *Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad*, an Islamic fundamentalist organisation of the Wahabi sects

in Pakistan; chief, Mohammed Latif. Other leaders in Pakistan: Abdur Rahman (religious scholar), Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (Prof. Hafiz Saeed). L-e-T operates in Srinagar Valley, Poonch, Rajauri, Doda, and Jammu. Runs training camps at Kotli and Samani in Azad Kashmir. Its rhetoric alludes to the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India. Believed by GOI to be composed of Pakistanis (from Punjab) and Afghans, and run by ISI. Lashkar-e-Taiba has suicide squads (fedayin). After the Jan. 2002 Musharraf crackdown, the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba renamed itself **Jamaat-ad Dawa** (Party of Preachers). [Karl Vick, "Skeptics Question Sincerity of Crackdown by Musharraf: Militant Groups Continue to Operate, but in the Shadows," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 2002, p. A-15.]

***Jaish-e-Mohammed** – founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in late 1999, after his release from Indian imprisonment as part of the Kandahar deal with the hijackers of an Indian Airline flight from Kathmandu in 1999. Azhar had been a leader of the **Harkat-ul-Ansar** before his imprisonment in 1994. Azhar is a conduit for funding from Saudi Arabia to Sipah-i-Sahaaba. (See JUI discussion below.) Harkat-ul-Ansar was blacklisted by Dept. of State. Before Musharraf's crackdown of January 2002, Jaish-e-Mohammed was also blacklisted by Dept. of State. It might have renamed itself ... (the magazine formerly called "Jaish-i-Muhammad" was renamed "al-Islah" or "Reform". [See Karl Vick, "Skeptics Question Sincerity of Crackdown by Musharraf: Militant Groups Continue to Operate, but in the Shadows," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 2002, p. A-15.] Vick's article says: Azhar telephoned a Pakistani newspaper to take credit for the October bombing in the J&K Legislative Assembly building in October 2001. Shaikh Omar Saeed (UK-reared) who was implicated in Daniel Pearl's kidnapping and assassination in February 2002, and who had been ransomed, like Azhar, from Indian jails as a result of the resolution of the air hijacking of an Indian airplane to Kandahar in January 2000, was part of Jaish-i-Muhammad. He claimed during interrogation to have known the perpetrators of the attack on India's national Parliament on 13 December 2001.

Jammat-ad Dawa - see above, this is what Lashkar renamed itself as in early 2002.

Islamic Political Parties and Related Militant Groups within Pakistan:

Taliban (students) literally are "seekers of knowledge" in madrassahs located all over the country. The *Taliban* movement (or political party) in Afghanistan drew primarily on Afghan refugees who grew up in madrassahs that served refugee areas in northwest Pakistan. In Pakistan, there are five major chains of madrassahs based respectively on Deobandi, Wahabi, Barelvi, Shia and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) schools of thought. Two of these chains - the Deobandi and Wahabi madrassahs - are those that are mainly responsible for churning out a brand of Islamic militants who have reportedly become a threat to the current social, cultural and political life in Pakistan.

Jamia Ashrafiyya, the main Deobandi Seminary in Lahore, Pakistan.

Pakistan Muslim League – nationalist, liberal, parliamentary in orientation, ecumenical (Shi'a as well as Sunni) rather than orthodox or fundamentalist in inspiration

Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) – Maulana Maudoodi, long-time leader (theorist), now deceased; current leader is Maulana Qazi Hussain Ahmad. HQ in Mansura, Lahore. JI does have *Madrassahs*, but they are not the source of the Taliban. Student wing of JI, however, has had an agitational role in elections, universities, etc., and therefore is a militant element within Pakistan. This student organization is the *Jamiat-e-Tulaba*. The JI-sponsored militant groups in Kashmir are the *Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin* and *Al-Badr*. The JI of Pakistan and the JI of J&K both support *Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin*. (There is a JI in every major South Asian state, even Sri Lanka.)

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) – Not oriented to militant Taliban movement, does not have Madrassahs as such, just religio-political activities. Active in the name of religion, Barelvi school, but not

militant. Moderate. Docile organization. Karachi-based. Muhajir-based, but also Punjabi. Hold corner meetings amongst members, no big jalsas, not that popular.

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)

The Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, had its origins in the Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), founded by a group of ulama of the Deoband Movement in prepartition India. The JUH argued that Muslims could coexist with other religions in a society where they were not the majority. In 1945, however, a group of JUH ulama, led by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani, split off from the JUH, formed the JUI, and gave their support to the movement for an independent Pakistan. Since 1947 the JUI has undergone a number of organizational and program changes. It developed strong support in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. In 1972 it joined the NAP to form governments in those two provinces. In 1977 the JUI contested the National Assembly election as a component of the Pakistan National Alliance. The JUI did not sympathize with General Zia's Islamization program, and in 1981 the JUI joined the MRD to pressure Zia to hold free elections. The JUI won six seats in the National Assembly in the 1990 elections. In the 1993 national elections, the JUI was the main component of the Islami Jamhoori Itihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance), which won four seats in the National Assembly.

JUI is connected with the Taliban. The Maulana Fazlur Rahman faction of JUI is sponsor of Sipah-e-Sahaba and its underground armed force, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Fazlur Rahman has been the more vocally anti-American of JUI leaders, promising to kill Americans in Pakistan if any further action is taken against Osama bin-Laden. He also has ordered his student group to take down the names and addresses of all Americans in the country.

The other faction of the JUI is led by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, from Akora Khattak. He is sometimes referred to as the leader of the "Pakistani Taliban," many Pakistanis having been educated at his madrassah in Akora Khattak. This faction is sponsor of Harkat-ul-Ansar, now Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin, the Harkat-ul-Jihad, and the Jaesh-e-Mohammed.

Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad - an Islamic fundamentalist organisation that grew out of the *Ahl-e-Hadith* (Wahabi sect), which dates back to British India. The Markaz was formed in Pakistan. Chief, Mohammed Latif. Believed to be sponsor of *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, which operates in Kashmir.

Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan (Soldiers of the Colleagues of the Prophet) – militant Sunni organization, funded by Saudi Arabia, Wahabiism. Outgrowth of Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Deoband faction of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Attributed with domestic intimidation of Shi'as. Big in Jhang and Multan area. It's underground, armed force is the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*. Maulana Azim Tariq. May have arisen in part from Zia's encouragement. Is involved with Taliban. Why, because Taliban mostly in South of Afghanistan. Has become a multinational organization (Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia), so this may also have an Osama bin Laden connection. In Karachi, Jamia Farooqia is a Sunni religious college (madrassah) with links to the radical anti-Shi'a Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan (SSP). The anti-Shia movement started in this madrassah in March 1983. Maulana Asfandyar was their leader. It was widely believed at that time that the madrassah received money from the Iraqi government.

Sipah-i-Mohammed – Allama Sajjid Naqvi, strong-armed, self-defense organization, Shi'a reaction to Sipah-i-Sahaba, strong around Lahore. HQ is Thokar Niaz Beg locality between Lahore and Raiwind. Local organization. Not involved in Kashmir. Not connected with the Taliban. *Imam-bargah* – the counterpart religious schools of the Shi'as (vis-a-vis Sunni *Madrassah*). Patronized by groups in Iran. Their funding may be connected with Sipah-i-Mohammed.

Tehrik Nifaz Fiqqah-i-Jafria (Movement for the Enforcement of Shi'a Muslim Law)

Tehreek-e-Jaafariya-e-Pakistan (TJP): Another Shi'a militant organization, defending against the anti-Shi'a movement in Pakistan. (Tehrik-i-Jaffaria-i-Pakistan)

Afghanistani names and terms:

Taliban (“students”) – acknowledged leader, ‘Mullah’ Mohammed Omar (usually Akhund follows his name, it means ‘mullah’). Taliban is predominantly derived from families of Afghan Pashtoon (Pathan) refugees who fled to Pakistan after 1980, and whose young men were reared in Islamic religious schools (madrassahs) inside Pakistan.

From a population of about 25 million, some 5 million Afghans became refugees (one-fifth), 3 million in Pakistan (mainly Pashtoons), and nearly 2 million in Iran (mainly Shi’is).

Afghan Ethnolinguistic groups:

Pashtoons (Pathan) are Sunni Muslims, southern, overlap with Pakistan, about one-third of population (two main branches, Durrani in west, centered in Kandahar, and Ghilzais in center-east, near Kabul; Durrani have been the source of much of the governing elite).

Hazara Shia’s, Dari or Persian (Farsi)-speaking, center (Hazarajat) and west.

Tadjiks – Persian (Farsi)-speaking, center and northeast. Persian (Farsi)-speakers combined make up about one half of the population, overlap with Tajikistan.

Uzbeks – Sunnis, Turkic language, northwest, overlap with Uzbekistan

Turkmen – Sunnis, Turkic language, northwest, overlap with Turkmenistan

Chahar Aimaks – Turkic language, mongoloid

Kirgyz – Turkic-speaking, north and northeast, overlap with Kirgyzstan

Nuristanis – eastern, have their own language (Nuristani, or Western Dardic)

Baluchis – Sunnis, with their own language, southeast, overlap with Pakistan

Brahuis, Pamiris, Hui – other fragmentary groups with Dardic, Pamiri, or other languages.

Political leaders:

President – Burhanuddin Rabbani

Prime Minister – Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (until Sept. 1996, when driven from Kabul by Taliban takeover). Hikmatyar’s group was Hizb-e-Islami.

Defense Minister – Ahmad Shah Masoud (until forced out, leader of the Panjshir Valley area, Tajiks)

Also Turkmen and Hazara (Shi’a) areas of the north were part of the Northern Alliance led by Uzbek Dostam (or Pahlwan, who temporarily betrayed and usurped Dostam) Tajik Massoud.

Abdur Rashid Dostam (Mazar-i-Sharif, Uzbek area, forced into exile, in Turkey, but returned to contest against Pahlwan)

Osama bin Laden (organization known as Al-Qaeda), Saudi-Yemeni jihadist/terrorist who has been given sanctuary by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Hindu Extremist Groups in India (better known):

Anand Marg (Bengal, Bihar, Orissa)

Vishwa Hindu Parishad (“World Council of Hindus”)

Hindu Mahasabha (assassinated Mahatma Gandhi)

Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), shock organizers for Jana Sangh and its successor, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), reminiscent of Hitler’s brown shirts

Shiv Sena (Maharashtra)

Chart One: Probabilities of State Failure Scenarios in Pakistan

Agents/Precipitants	National Disintegration		Revolutionary State Overthrow		Harsh Indigenization	
	Peacetime	Wartime	From Without	From Within	Traditional Islam	Extremist Islam
(1) Regional/Ethnolinguistic						
<i>Pushtoon</i>	0	<1			3	2
<i>Sindhi</i>	1	>3			4	1
<i>Baluchi</i>	<1	>1			>4	<1
<i>Muhajir (MQM)</i>	<1	>2			>4	<1
<i>Punjabi & Siraiki</i>	N/A	N/A			3	2
(2) Islamic Organizations						
<i>JUI</i>			<2	>2 (?)	1	4
<i>Ji</i>			0	>1	2	3
<i>JUP</i>			<1	0	4	1
<i>JUAH (Ahle-Hadith)</i>			0	>2	<1	>4
<i>Tehrik-i-Jaafriya (Shia)</i>			0	>1	3	2

Key: Probability Scale - 5 = very high, 1 = very low, 0 = nil

Chart Two: Sunni Political Parties in Pakistan: Orientation and Characteristics				
	<i>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)</i>	<i>Jama'at-i-Islami (JI)</i>	<i>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)</i>	<i>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Ahle Hadith (JUAH)</i>
School	Barelvi	Modernist	Deobandi	Wahabi
Orthodoxy	syncretic, folk-oriented	intellectual puritanism	strictly orthodox	theocratic, ultra-orthodox
Ideology	pragmatic - nationalist	reformist - nationalist	Islamic hard-line	militantly nationalist
On Shias	variable, opportunistic	negative but pragmatic	extremely hostile	extremely hostile
On Kashmir	mainstream	militant	fiercely militant	fiercely militant
On Afghanistan	pro-Taliban	pro-Taliban	sponsor of Taliban	jihadi
Saudi links	yes	yes	yes	yes (intimate)
Iraqi links	yes	?	yes	?
Geographical Strength	Karachi, Punjab	urban Punjab and Sindh	urban Punjab, Karachi	urban Punjab
Social Base	Urdu-speakers in Sindh rural/small town Punjabis	urban educated middle class	Pathans, Punjabis, lower classes, and bazaaris	
Membership Size	substantial but declining	small, urban, disciplined	substantial	relatively small
Top Leaders	MIn Shah Ahmad Noorani MIn Abdus Sattar Niazi	Qazi Hussain Ahmed	MIn Fazlur Rahman MIn Sami-ul-Haq	Allama Ahsan Ilali Zahir
Armed Militias	apparently none	Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin	Sipah-i-Sahaba Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin Jaesh-i-Muhammad	Lashkar-i-Tayyaba

Chart Three: Map of Pakistani Islamic Militant Groups



